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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Thomas M. Winn, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses three principal areas of state labor and
employment law in which there was significant activity in Vir-
ginia's state and federal courts over the past year: (1) the doctrine
of employment-at-will;' (2) non-competition and non-solicitation
agreements;2 and (3) respondeat superior and negligent hiring
and retention claims.' In addition, this article summarizes some
of the significant legislative enactments affecting the em-
ployer/employee relationship.4 Beyond the scope of this article are
decisions rendered in other areas of law affecting the employment
relationship, including public employment claims,5 unemploy-
ment compensation claims,6 and workers' compensation claims.7
* Principal, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia. A.B., 1990,
Duke University; J.D., 1993, University of Richmond School of Law, cum laude.
1. See discussion infra Part II.
2. See discussion infra Part III.
3. See discussion infra Part IV.
4. See discussion infra Part V.
5. See, e.g., Siewert v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., No. HS-21-4, 2002 WL 334897
(Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 14, 2002) (Richmond City) (overturning hearing officer's rescission of dis-
cipline imposed on police officer for causing damage to vehicle); Teacher Discharge-
Contract-Grievance Procedure, VA. LAW. WKLY. Mar. 4, 2002, at 11.
6. See, e.g., Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 564 S.E.2d 127 (2002) (holding
that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the city could not be held liable under a
negligent retention theory for alleged rapes by officer during ongoing investigation of al-
leged victim's complaint concerning her son); Cent. Delivery Serv. Washington, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia Employment Comm'n, No. 2046002, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 617 (Ct. App. Nov. 6,
2001) (unpublished decision) (reversing Commission's decision holding certain contract
drivers "employees" for purposes of unemployment compensation, instead of independent
contractors outside the scope of the Act); Stasko v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 53 Va.
Cir. 292 (Cir. Ct. 2001) (Charlottesville City) (affirming Commission's disqualification of
claimant who quit his job when his employer changed his compensation from salary basis
to hourly basis); Azimi v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 57 Va. Cir. 1 (Cir. Ct. 2001)
(Fairfax County) (affirming denial of unemployment compensation to employee who was
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II. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
The principle of employment-at-will is well established in Vir-
ginia.' The Supreme Court of Virginia has explained in this regard
that "Virginia adheres to the common-law rule that when the in-
tended duration of a contract for the rendition of services cannot be
determined by fair inference from the terms of the contract, then ei-
ther party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate the contract at-
will .... 9
Thus, in Virginia, where no specific time period is fixed for the
duration of employment, there is a presumption that employment
is at-will, terminable at any time by either party for any reason,
with or without cause.1 ° The employment-at-will doctrine ordinar-
ily precludes at-will employees who are terminated from assert-
ing common law causes of action for wrongful discharge or wrong-
ful termination of employment.11 Over the years, however,
plaintiffs have continued their assault on the at-will doctrine
through creative pleading.
A. Reasonable Notice
Some of the early decisions addressing the at-will employment
doctrine have implied a requirement that the employment may be
terminated by either party, with or without cause, at any time
"upon reasonable notice." This ambiguous clause can be traced
back to Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,12
which held that:
[Wihen a contract calls for the rendition of services, if it is so far in-
complete as that the period of its intended duration cannot be de-
unavailable to work during hours employer required her services).
7. See, e.g., Osborne v. Forner, 36 Va. App. 91, 548 S.E.2d 270 (Ct. App. 2001) (deny-
ing benefit and holding that a sole proprietor paint contractor who occasionally retained
the services of three different painters did not regularly employ or move employees).
8. See Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. 586, 594, 164 S.E. 397, 399 (1932).
9. Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 96-97, 465 S.E.2d 806,
808 (1996) (quoting Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 102, 439
S.E.2d 328, 330 (1994)).
10. Id. at 96-97, 465 S.E.2d at 808; Bowman v. State Bank, 229 Va. 534, 535, 331
S.E.2d 797, 798 (1985).
11. Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth, 251 Va. at 97, 465 S.E.2d at 808.
12. 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E. 551 (1906).
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termined by a fair inference from its provisions either party is ordi-
narily at liberty to terminate it at-will on giving reasonable notice of
his intention to do so. 13
Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia have con-
tinued to feature reasonable notice language in describing the at-will
employment rule. More recently, in Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc.," the
court affirmed the continued adherence to the freedom of parties "to
terminate the contract at will, upon giving the other party reason-
able notice." 5
In Brehm v. Mathis,6 the plaintiff asserted a cause of action
based on her employer's alleged failure to provide her with rea-
sonable notice that her employment was being terminated. The
parties cited conflicting decisions as to whether there is a "rea-
sonable notice" exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 7
The defendant cited Perry v. American Home Products Corp."8 and
Wilt v. Water & Wastewater Equipment Manufacturers Ass'n,' 9
which both held that an at-will employee does not have an inde-
pendent cause of action for the employer's failure to give reason-
able notice of termination.2"
The plaintiff, on the other hand, cited Person v. Bell Atlantic-
Virginia, Inc.,21 and Laudenslager v. Loral," which held that
there is an implied obligation to give reasonable notice of termi-
nation unless there is an agreement to the contrary.23 The court
in Brehm noted that Laudenslager recognized "an implied obliga-
tion requiring each party to an at-will employment relationship to
give the other reasonable notice of termination unless there is an
agreement to the contrary, and that failure to give such notice
[was] actionable as a breach of an implied contract."24 The court
distinguished Person, however, on the grounds that the claim was
13. Id. at 226, 55 S.E. at 552 (emphasis added).
14. 234 Va. 462, 362 S.E.2d 915 (1987).
15. Id. at 465, 362 S.E.2d at 916-17.
16. No. 25917, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 120 (Cir. Ct. Mar. 11, 2002) (Loudoun County).
17. Id. at *3-4.
18. No. 3:96CV595, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2521 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 1997).
19. 43 Va. Cir. 118 (Cir. Ct. 1997) (Loudoun County).
20. See Perry, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2521, at *20-22; Wilt, 43 Va. Cir. at 122.
21. 993 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Va. 1998).
22. 39 Va. Cir. 228 (Cir. Ct. 1996) (Chesapeake City).
23. See Person, 993 F. Supp. at 961-62; Laudenslager, 39 Va. Cir. at 229.
24. Brehm, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 120, at *4-5 (citing Laudenslager, 39 Va. Cir. 228).
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preempted by the federal Labor Management Relations Act2" and
thus it was unnecessary for the district court to address the state
law on giving notice of termination to an at-will employee.26 The
court further observed that Person cited Slade v. Central Fidelity
Bank27 for the proposition that the failure to give reasonable no-
tice is actionable as a breach of contract.28
The court concluded after analyzing the extant case law, that
no "decision of the Virginia Supreme Court [sic] explains the na-
ture of the reasonable notice of termination obligation that is al-
ways included in any explanation of the employment-at-will doc-
trine."29 In the final analysis, the court was unpersuaded that the
obligation to provide "reasonable notice" required the employer to
give an at-will employee notice of his termination in a reasonable
period of time before he is actually terminated. ° Judge Chamblin
explained:
I do not agree with this argument because it conflicts with the es-
sence of an at will employment, namely, that the period of its in-
tended duration cannot be determined. Adding a required period of
time that is reasonable between notice of termination and actual
termination undermines the indefinite duration element of an at will
employment.
31
Instead, the court opined that the reasonable notice require-
ment merely imposed an obligation on the part of the employer to
afford "reasonable notice" that the employee was being termi-
nated, rather than "reasonable notice" in the temporal sense prior
to effecting the termination decision. 2 The court explained that
the requirement of "reasonable notice" prevented an employer
from terminating an employee without notifying him or her of the
termination, while retaining the benefits, but not the costs, of the
employee's services.33 This conclusion, while perhaps logically
sound, would appear to have little application to the modern
workplace. Nonetheless, this decision should afford employers
25. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-157 (2000).
26. Brehm, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 120, at *4.
27. 12 Va. Cir. 291 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Campbell County).
28. Brehm, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 120, at *5 (citing Slade, 12 Va. Cir. 291).
29. Id.
30. Id. at *5-6.
31. Id. at *6.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *6-7
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some comfort, from a liability perspective, in handling termina-
tion decisions without adhering to the common practice of provid-
ing "two weeks notice" so often afforded in terminations without
cause.
B. Effect of Handbook Policies on At-Will Status
Prudent employers with employee handbooks and detailed per-
sonnel policies, particularly with regard to discipline, include con-
tract disclaimers in their manuals to avoid breach of contract claims
or arguments by potential plaintiffs that terminations must be in
strict accordance with the guidelines set forth in such materials. In
County of Giles v. Wines,34 the Supreme Court of Virginia faced these
very issues in determining whether the plaintiff "presented sufficient
evidence to support a jury's finding that he had an employment con-
tract terminable only for just cause."35 The plaintiff based his claim
on the detailed disciplinary personnel policies in the county's em-
ployee handbook.36 Specifically, the plaintiff was discharged for "per-
sonality conflicts" and "poor judgments" in the face of a county policy
that provided that "[an employee may be discharged for inefficiency,
insubordination, misconduct, or other just cause."37
The court began its analysis by reciting the now familiar prin-
ciples underpinning the employment-at-will doctrine:
Virginia strongly adheres to the common law employment-at-will
doctrine. In Virginia, an employment relationship is presumed to be
at-will, which means that the employment term extends for an in-
definite period and may be terminated by the employer or employee
for any reason upon reasonable notice .... An employee is ordinarily
at liberty to leave his employment for any reason or for no reason,
upon giving reasonable notice, without incurring liability to his em-
ployer. Notions of fundamental fairness underlie the concept of mu-
tuality which extends a corresponding freedom to the employer. The
presumption that an at-will employment relationship exists may be
rebutted, however, if sufficient evidence is produced to show that the
employment is for a definite, rather than an indefinite, term.
38
34. 262 Va. 68, 546 S.E.2d 721 (2001).
35. Id. at 70, 546 S.E.2d at 721.
36. Id. at 73, 546 S.E.2d at 723.
37. Id. at 70-71, 546 S.E.2d at 722.
38. Id. at 72, 546 S.E.2d at 723 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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Quoting its early decision in Norfolk Southern Railway v. Har-
ris,39 the court explained that a contractual agreement stating
"that an employee 'will not be disciplined or dismissed from [em-
ployment] without a just cause' creates a definite term for the du-
ration of the employment and that the employer could only dis-
miss the employee for cause. "40 Applying these principles, the
court held that the employee "failed to present evidence that he had
an employment contract terminable solely for cause sufficient to re-
but the employment-at-will presumption."41 The county's personnel
policy stated that " [a]n employee may be discharged for inefficiency,
insubordination, misconduct, or other just cause."'42 The court fo-
cused upon the word "may" explaining that the word did not limit
the employer's discharge options to termination only for cause, but
merely provided examples of reasons for which an employee could be
terminated.4 ' The court noted that the policy did not "state that an
employee will not be discharged without just cause. 44 The court also
observed that other sections of the county's personnel policies were
"devoid of any language which changes the nature of the at-will em-
ployment relationship between the County and its employees." 45 For
these reasons the court held "that the personnel policy at issue in
this case is not sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in favor of
the at-will employment relationship in this Commonwealth."46
In so holding, the court relied heavily upon its decision in Pro-
gress Printing Co. v. Nichols,47 a case that "considered whether an
employee was terminable at-will or whether he had an employ-
ment contract which prohibited termination without just cause."4
Progress had provided its employee, Nichols, with a copy of the
Employee Handbook that contained a provision stating that the
"company would not discharge or suspend an employee 'without
just cause and shall give a last warning notice... in writing' ex-
39. 190 Va. 966, 976, 59 S.E.2d 110, 114 (1950).
40. Giles, 262 Va. at 72-73, 546 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting Harris, 190 Va. at 969, 976, 59
S.E.2d at 111, 114).
41. Id. at 73, 546 S.E.2d at 723.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 244 Va. 337, 421 S.E.2d 428 (1992).
48. Giles, 262 Va. at 73-74, 546 S.E.2d at 724.
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cept under certain circumstances."49 The employer, however, also
required "the employee to [sign] [an acknowledgment] form which
stated that the employment relationship between Progress Print-
ing and the employee was 'at-will and may be terminated by ei-
ther party at any time."'5 The court recognized that the direct
conflict between the provision and the acknowledgment form
[could not] be reconciled in any reasonable way' ruling that "the
acknowledgment form that the employee had executed super-
seded and replaced the provision in the handbook with the
agreement that the employment relationship was terminable at-
will."51 Therefore, the court held that .'[i]f the documents are con-
sidered a single contract, as the trial court considered them, this
conflict, along with the conflicting testimony of the parties as to
the nature of the employment relationship, fails to provide suffi-
cient evidence to rebut the presumption of employment at-will.' 52
Justices Lacy, Kinser, and Lemons dissented from the majority
decision in Giles, relying on the disciplinary policy in the person-
nel manual stating that an employee "may be discharged for inef-
ficiency, insubordination, misconduct, or other just cause."53 Jus-
tice Lacy disagreed with the majority's interpretation of that
policy:
Viewing this statement in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
the word "may" must be construed to mean, not that the employer is
at liberty to discharge for causes other than "just cause," but as al-
lowing the employer to impose a penalty of less than discharge for
any of those infractions although such infractions constitute grounds
for termination. Section 8-5 also requires the employer to provide the
employee with the reasons for termination, a condition that is incon-
sistent with employment at-will, which requires no reason for termi-
nation. Finally, [section] 8-7, "Causes for Suspension, Demotion, or
Dismissal," lists sixteen other specific acts which support a decision
to terminate employment. Giving the provisions of the manual a rea-
sonable construction and one favorable to the plaintiff compels the
conclusion that the manual allows termination for no grounds other
than those identified in [sections] 8-5 and 8-7.
5 4
49. Id. at 73, 546 S.E.2d at 724 (quoting Progress Printing, 244 Va. 339, 421 S.E.2d at
429) (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 74, 546 S.E.2d at 724 (quoting Progress Printing, 244 Va. at 339, 421 S.E.2d
at 429).
51. Id. (quoting Progress Printing, 244 Va. at 342, 421 S.E.2d at 431).
52. Id. (quoting Progress Printing, 244 Va. at 342, 421 S.E.2d at 431).
53. Id. at 77, 546 S.E.2d at 726 (Lacy, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Lacy, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, Justice Lacy noted that the County Administrator,
the chief personnel officer of the county, testified that, when the
employee was first terminated, the Administrator interpreted the
personnel policy as allowing termination only for cause, as did a
member of the County's Board of Supervisors." Justice Lacy ex-
plained that "[cionsideration of this evidence is appropriate be-
cause evidence of the parties' conduct and intent, including a
party's interpretation of the contract, is 'entitled to great weight'
in determining the construction of an ambiguous contract."56 Jus-
tice Lacy took issue with the majority's rejection of this evidence
on the grounds that it merely raised an estoppel argument and
that estoppel could not be asserted against the county.57 Justice
Lacy further observed that the employer did not raise an estoppel
argument either directly or indirectly and that the majority had
created the issue on its own.58
The final basis for the dissent was the disagreement over the
"new standard ... established" by the majority.59 Justice Lacy
noted that
the majority rejected all evidence except the employee manual itself
and vacated the jury verdict in favor of the employee because the
employee could not point to a statement in the personnel manual
that the employee "shall only" be terminated for just cause or that
the employee "will not be discharged without just cause."60
The Justice claimed that this approach would result in an "entry
of judgment in favor of the employer, regardless of the evidence
introduced."6' The dissenters expressed grave concern over the
potential for this decision to upset the established balance be-
tween the jury and the trial court.62 Justice Lacy decried "this
new 'rule,' which eviscerates the historic role of the jury in em-
ployment termination cases, without acknowledging what has
55. Id. (Lacy, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 78, 546 S.E.2d at 726 (Lacy, J., dissenting) (quoting Dart Drug Corp. v.
Nicholakos, 221 Va. 989, 995, 277 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1981)).
57. Id. (Lacy, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Lacy, J., dissenting). Justice Lacy also disagreed with the majority's applica-
tion of the Progress Printing standards to this case. Id. at 78-79, 546 S.E.2d at 727 (Lacy,
J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 79, 546 S.E.3d at 727 (Lacy, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 80, 546 S.E.2d at 727 (Lacy, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Lacy, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 80, 546 S.E.2d at 727-28 (Lacy, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 37:241
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
been done or explaining the basis for or perimeters of the rule
imposed."63
The significance of the Giles case is perhaps revealed most
acutely through Justice Lacy's opinion. The decision would ap-
pear to erect an extremely high burden for plaintiffs who seek to
contend that personnel policies give rise to contractual rights su-
perseding the employment-at-will doctrine. That this case arose
in a public employment setting is also noteworthy and leaves
practitioners wondering how this decision may affect the statu-
tory grievance rights of discharged public employees.
C. The "Public Policy" Exception64
In the seminal case of Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 5 the
Supreme Court of Virginia recognized, for the first time, a "nar-
row exception" to the employment-at-will doctrine which allows
at-will employees to state a claim for wrongful discharge if they
can identify a public policy that was violated by the termination
of their employment.66 In the more than fifteen years since Bow-
man, plaintiffs have roamed the legislative landscape creatively
searching for statutes expressive of Virginia's "public policy."
While the past year lacked the judicial blockbusters in this area
that we have come to expect from the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, several notable opinions were issued.
63. Id. (Lacy, J., dissenting).
64. For a comprehensive overview of the evolution of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy claims, see Thomas R. Bagby & Thomas M. Winn, III, Connor v. National
Pest Control Association: The Death Knell for Public Policy Discriminatory Discharge
Claims?, 11 J. CIv. LITIG. 149 (1999); and Thomas M. Winn, III, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Labor and Employment Law, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 965 (1999) [hereinafter Winn, La-
bor and Employment]; and Thomas M. Winn, III, The Supreme Court Opens the Back Door
for Public Policy Discriminatory Discharge Claims, 12 J. CIV. LITIG. 1 (2000).
65. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
66. Id. at 539-40, 331 S.E.2d at 800-01.
67. See, e.g., City of Virginia Beach v. Harris, 259 Va. 220, 523 S.E.2d 239 (2000);
Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 523 S.E.2d 246 (2000); Connor v. Nat'l Pest Control
Ass'n, 257 Va. 286, 513 S.E.2d 398 (1999); Dray v. New Mkt. Poultry Prods., Inc., 258 Va.
187, 518 S.E.2d 312 (1999); Doss v. JAMCO, 254 Va. 362, 492 S.E.2d 441 (1997); Bradick
v. Grumman Data Sys. Corp., 254 Va. 156, 486 S.E.2d 545 (1997); Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher,
Inc., 253 Va. 121, 480 S.E.2d 502 (1997); Clark v. Manheim Servs. Corp., 38 Va. Cir. 479
(Va. 1996) (per curiam); Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 439
S.E.2d 328 (1994).
2002]
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In Rowan v. Tractor Supply Company,6" the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Virginia entered a certifica-
tion order pursuant to Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 5:42.69 The
order requested that the Supreme Court of Virginia answer the
following question: "Does a complaint state a Bowman claim un-
der § 18.2-460 when the plaintiff, an at-will employee, alleges
that her employer terminated her employment because she re-
fused to yield to employer's demand that she discontinue pursu-
ing criminal charges of assault and battery against a fellow em-
ployee?"7"
The plaintiff alleged that she was terminated after her em-
ployer told her to "keep her mouth shut" or she would "suffer the
consequences" of reporting suspected embezzlement by fellow
employees.7' She further alleged that her manager physically as-
saulted and battered her when she expressed her concerns about
the alleged transgressions.7 2 As is typical in these cases, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia began its analysis with a review of Bow-
man and its progeny.73 The court summarized the parameters of
the public policy exception by observing:
[We have.., allowed such an action to proceed when the public pol-
icy violated by the employer was explicitly expressed in the statute
and the employee was clearly a member of that class of persons di-
rectly entitled to the protection enunciated by the public policy....
[W]e have recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge where
the discharge was based on the employee's refusal to engage in a
criminal act. Although criminal statutes do not contain explicit
statements of public policy, the protection of the general public from
lawless acts is an unquestioned policy underlying such statutes. We
recognized that allowing the employment-at-will doctrine to "serve
as a shield for employers who seek to force their employees, under
the threat of discharge, to engage in criminal activity" would violate
this most compelling public policy. 
74
In Rowan, however, the court noted that the common law ac-
tion at issue was not based on a public policy expressly set out in
68. 263 Va. 209, 559 S.E.2d 709 (2002).
69. Id. at 211, 559 S.E.2d at 709; see also VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:42.
70. Rowan, 263 Va. at 211, 559 S.E.2d at 709; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-460
(Cum. Supp. 2001).
71. Rowan, 263 Va. at 211-12, 559 S.E.2d at 709-10.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 213, 559 S.E.2d at 710-11.
74. Id. at 214, 559 S.E.2d at 711.
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a specific statute as it was in other cases where the claims were
deemed actionable.75 Nor did the plaintiff claim she was entitled
to maintain her claim because she was terminated for refusing to
engage in a criminal act as in other cases where the claims were
allowed to proceed. 6
Rather, the plaintiff asserted that Virginia Code section 18.2-
460 is "consistent with the policy of the Commonwealth to protect
the public from criminals by shielding those who participate in
the prosecution and trial of suspected wrongdoers."77 The plaintiff
argued that "the statute must provide her with a right to such
protection and [that] the violation of such right by her employer
is a violation of public policy sufficient to support her common
law cause of action."
7 8
The court disagreed with the plaintiff,79 explaining:
[U]nlike the shareholders' right to vote shares granted by the statute
in Bowman, § 18.2-460 does not grant a person involved in a criminal
prosecution any specific right. Also, in Bowman the public policy vio-
lated existed to protect the exercise of the statutory right, but here
there is no statutory right and, therefore, there exists no correspond-
ing public policy necessary to protect the right.
8 0
Moreover, the court concluded that the plaintiffs description of
the public policy underlying Virginia Code section 18.2-460 was
inconsistent with prior case law:
We have previously described the public policy underlying the ob-
struction of justice statute as reflecting the General Assembly's in-
tent to prohibit interference with the administration of justice and as
protecting the public's safety and welfare. The goal of this policy is
not to protect individuals from intimidation, but to protect the public
from a flawed legal system due to impaired prosecution of criminals.
Thus, TSC's actions in discharging Rowan did not violate a right
granted to her but rather violated a criminal statute enacted to en-
sure that the administration of justice is not subverted.8 '
In conclusion, the court held that Virginia Code section 18.2-
460 "did not create any statutory right or a corresponding public
75. Id.; see, e.g., Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121, 480 S.E.2d 502 (1997);
Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 (1994).
76. Rowan, 263 Va. at 214, 559 S.E.2d at 711; see, e.g., Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va.
179, 190, 523 S.E.2d 246, 252 (2000).
77. Rowan, 263 Va. at 214, 559 S.E.2d at 711.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 215, 559 S.E.2d at 711.
81. Id. at 215, 559 S.E.2d at 711-12 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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policy of the type that would support an exception to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine and thus allow a common law action for
wrongful termination." 2 Accordingly, the court answered the cer-
tified question in the negative. 3 Employers concerned about the
recent trend emerging from Mitchem v. Counts84 may take some
comfort in knowing that the public policy exception is not without
its limits insofar as criminal statutes are concerned.
In Collins v. Franklin,"5 the plaintiff sued a shareholder of her
employer, who later became the employer's president, for sexual
harassment, urging the court to recognize a common law cause of
action for sexual harassment. 6 Relying on Mitchem" the plain-
tiff contended that her claim should be permitted to proceed be-
cause Virginia courts have recognized a cause of action against an
employer for wrongful termination of employment in violation of
public policy.88 The District Court for the Western District of Vir-
ginia rejected the claim, explaining:
This precedent is not applicable here since the defendant was not the
plaintiffs employer. There is no support in Virginia law for a free-
standing tort of sexual harassment, not involving a claim against an
employer for wrongful discharge or for a hostile or abusive workplace
imputable to the employer. Therefore, the plaintiff has no cause of
action in this regard.
Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to char-
acterize the purported conduct as "solicitation of the crimes of
fornication or adultery"9" warranting a civil cause of action.91 The
court explained that "solicitation of a misdemeanor such as forni-
cation or adultery is not a crime, ' 2 and that "a private right of ac-
tion cannot be implied from a criminal statute.93
82. Id. at 215, 559 S.E.2d at 712.
83. Id.
84. 259 Va. 179, 523 S.E.2d 246 (2000).
85. No. 2:00CV00044, 2001 WL 589029 (W.D. Va. May 29, 2001).
86. Id. at * 1.
87. 259 Va. at 187, 523 S.E.2d at 250 (upholding cause of action for wrongful termina-
tion based on the statutory public policies against fornication and lewd and lascivious be-
havior).
88. Collins, 2001 WL 589029, at *3.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344, -365 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
91. Collins, 2001 WL 589029, at *3.
92. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-29 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002); Weath-
erford v. Commonwealth, No. 1489-90-1, 1992 WL 877506 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1992) (un-
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In Hammonds v. Builders First Source-Atlantic Group, Inc.,"
the plaintiff, a truck driver, alleged his employer unlawfully de-
nied him light duty opportunities and discharged him in violation
of public policy." First, the plaintiff attempted to rely on the poli-
cies expressed in the Virginians with Disabilities Act ("VDA") 6
The court began its analysis with an overview of the VDA:
It is undisputed that the VDA "is the statement of Virginia's public
policy against disability discrimination." Its purpose is "to encourage
and enable persons with disabilities to participate fully and equally
in the social and economic life of the Commonwealth and to engage
in remunerative employment." However, the VDA also states that
"the relief available for violations of this chapter shall be limited to
the relief set forth in this section." This provision makes the VDA the
exclusive state remedy for disability-based discrimination in em-
ployment.
97
Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted because "any disability
discrimination claim alleged by the plaintiff should have been
pursued under the remedies provided in the VDA itself."98
In addition, the plaintiff referred without elaboration to the
public policy allegedly reflected by Virginia Code section 40.1-
51. 1," which requires every employer:
"[T]o furnish each of his employees safe employment and a place of
employment which is free from recognized hazards that are causing
or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employ-
ees, and to comply with all applicable occupational safety and health
rules and regulations promulgated under this title."
100
1992) (unpublished decision)).
93. Id. (citing Vansoat & Guster, Inc. v. Washington, 245 Va. 356, 360, 429 S.E.2d 31,
33 (1993)).
94. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6202 (W.D. Va. Mar. 28, 2002).
95. Id. at *7-8. The plaintiff alleged a breach of contract claim, but the court held that
he had not presented any facts to overcome the presumption of employment-at-will. Id. at
*8-10. In addition, the court rejected plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim. Id. at *10-12.
96. Id. at *12; VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-41 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
97. Hammonds, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6202, at *14 (citations omitted).
98. Id.
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
100. Hammonds, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6202, at *15 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-
51.1(A)).
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The plaintiff suggested that defendant's refusal to afford him
light duty work violated the public policy reflected by this stat-
ute.1"1 The court rejected this argument as well, reasoning:
Without addressing whether this statute could provide the basis for
a public policy-based wrongful discharge claim, the court fails to see
any connection between the plaintiffs allegations (failure to provide
light duty work) and the duties imposed on the employer (maintain-
ing a work place without recognized hazards) under § 40.1- 51.1.102
The court noted the creativity of this argument, but concluded
it was without any legal basis because "[slection 40.1-51.1 obli-
gates an employer to provide a workplace free of 'exposure to toxic
materials or harmful physical agents."' ' Despite plaintiffs con-
tentions, the statute did not afford, "a workplace which ensures
equal treatment of disabled persons."0 4 Ultimately, the court
dismissed the claim, concluding that the plaintiff had alleged no
facts that brought the case within the purview of this occupa-
tional safety statute.0 5
In one of the more interesting "public policy" cases from the
past year, Morgan v. American Diabetes Association, 06 the plain-
tiff alleged his employer fired him in response to statements he
made to management concerning a fellow employee's sexual har-
assment complaint.107 In a bench ruling, the Alexandria Circuit
Court overruled the defendant's demurrer and held that the
plaintiff made out a Bowman claim, finding an actionable public
policy in the plaintiffs right to free speech under the Virginia
Constitution. 0 8 As one commentator observed:
The Virginia Constitution's free speech clause is not implicated by
the plaintiffs claim. Specifically, it is well settled that Article I, § 12
of the Virginia Constitution... forbids most government regulation
of the speech of its citizens; it does not, however, guarantee that
there will be no private consequences flowing from such protected
speech. 10 9
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *16 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
104. Id. (quoting the Plaintiffs Objection to Report and Recommendation).
105. Id.
106. No. CL010463 (Cir. Ct. 2001) (Alexandria City) (unpublished decision). For com-
ment on the case, see King F. Tower, The Morgan Case: Which Law Will Prevail, VA. LAW.
WKLY., Dec. 24, 2001, at B2.
107. Tower, supra note 106.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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This case obviously has significant ramifications for employers
employing fewer than fifteen employees who presently are not
susceptible to retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.11° As the case presently is unreported, it is unclear
what, if any, real impact it will have in future litigation, absent
an appeal and resolution of these issues.
D. The Statute of Frauds
In Shiple v. Jackson,"' plaintiff pursued a breach of employ-
ment contract claim, contending that his employer had induced
him to leave a high-paying job to take a job at the same salary
with a commitment by the employer to commit some $250,000 to
fund the venture. 112 The plaintiff alleged he was paid for only two
months before the defendant informed him that he would not
fund the venture as he allegedly had promised.
1 13
The "Id]efendant demurr[ed], contending the alleged oral con-
tract violate[d] Virginia's statute of frauds,"4 which requires a
writing for a contract that cannot be fully performed within one
year."1 5 The defendant appears to have argued that the plaintiffs
employment, without the benefit of a contract, was for an indefi-
nite period of time and was subject to the employment-at-will
doctrine."' With little explanation, the court overruled the de-
murrer on the grounds that employment-at-will and wrongful
discharge were not pertinent issues in the case. 7
III. NON-COMPETITION AND NON-SOLICITATION AGREEMENTS
Employers in Virginia face a number of obstacles in seeking to
enforce non-competition agreements. As an initial matter, cove-
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
111. No. LL-2348-1 (Cir. Ct. 2001) (Richmond City) (order overruling demurrer). For
comment on the case, see Employment-Statute of Frauds-Internet Wine Business, VA. LAW.
WKLY., July 2, 2001, at 11 [hereinafter Employment].
112. Employment, supra note 111.
113. Id.
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2(8) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
115. Employment, supra note 111.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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nants in restraint of trade are not favored, will be strictly con-
strued against the employer, and, in the event of an ambiguity,
will be construed in favor of the employee.118 Moreover, the em-
ployer bears the burden of proving that the restraint is reason-
able119 applying the following tripartite standard that attempts to
balance the employer's, its employees', and the public's interests:
Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer, reasonable in
the sense that it is no greater than necessary to protect the employer
in some legitimate business interest?
From the standpoint of the employee, is the restraint reasonable in
the sense that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing his
legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood?
Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a sound public pol-
icy?
120
The Supreme Court of Virginia attempted to clarify the first
standard in two widely debated decisions from last year, Sim-
mons v. Miller 2' and Motion Control Systems, Inc. v. East. 122 This
year, the court fleshed out the second standard in Modern Envi-
ronments, Inc. v. Stinnett. 123
In Stinnett, a former employee, who worked for a competitor of
her former employer, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking
a declaration that a non-compete agreement was unenforceable
because it was overbroad and contrary to public policy. 124 The
provision of the employment agreement at issue stated:
Employee agrees that for as long as Employee remains employed by
the company, and for a period of one (1) years [sic] after Employee's
employment with the Company ceases, Employee will not (i) directly
or indirectly, own, manage, operate, control, be employed by, partici-
pate in or be associated in any manner with the ownership, manage-
ment, operation, or control of any business similar to the type of busi-
118. Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 795, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962); see Sim-
mons v. Miller 261 Va. 561, 581, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (2001) (citing Grant v. Carotek, Inc.,
737 F.2d 410, 412 (4th Cir. 1984)).
119. Simmons, 261 Va. at 581, 544 S.E.2d at 678 (citing Blue Ridge Anesthesia v.
Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 371-72, 389 S.E.2d 467, 468-69 (1990)).
120. Advanced Marine Enters. v. PRC, Inc., 256 Va. 106, 118, 501 S.E.2d 148, 155
(1998).
121. 261 Va. 561, 544 S.E.2d 666 (2001).
122. 262 Va. 33, 546 S.E.2d 424 (2001); see Winn, Labor and Employment, supra note
64, at 726-29 (discussing Simmons and Motion Control).
123. 263 Va. 491, 561 S.E.2d 694 (2002).
124. Id. at 492, 561 S.E.2d at 695.
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ness conducted by the company or any of its affiliates (a "competing
business"), which competing business is within a fifty (50) mile ra-
dius of the home office or any business location or locations of the
Company or any of its affiliates at which Employee worked.
125
The trial court held that the covenant was overbroad and unen-
forceable because it prohibited the former employee from being
employed in any capacity by a competitor.126 The employer as-
serted that the restrictive language at issue was reasonable and
not over-broad as a matter of law, citing numerous cases in which
the Supreme Court of Virginia had previously enforced identical
or similar language in other employment agreements and had not
held such language to be overbroad.127
The court distinguished the cases cited by the employer, ob-
serving:
[Tihis [clourt did not limit its review to considering whether the re-
strictive covenants were facially reasonable. The [c]ourt examined
the legitimate, protectable interests of the employer, the nature of
the former and subsequent employment of the employee, whether
the actions of the employee actually violated the terms of the non-
compete agreements, and the nature of the restraint in light of all
the circumstances of the case. The language of the non-compete
agreement was considered in the context of the facts of the specific
case. In no case did the [clourt hold that the language contained in
the restrictive covenant at issue was valid and enforceable as a mat-
ter of law under all circumstances.
128
Only one of the cases cited by the employer, Blue Ridge Anes-
thesia & Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick,29 involved a challenge to
125. Id. at 493-94, 561 S.E.2d at 695 (emphasis in original).
126. Id. at 494, 561 S.E.2d at 695.
127. Id. (citing Rash v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 251 Va. 281, 285, 467 S.E.2d 791,
794 (1996) (employee "shall not directly or indirectly as an... employee.., or other par-
ticipant... engage in any manner in any" competing business); New River Media Group,
Inc. v. Knighton, 245 Va. 367, 368, 429 S.E.2d 25, 26 (1993) (employee "would not engage
in a business that competed"); Blue Ridge Anesthesia & Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 239
Va. 369, 370, 389 S.E.2d 467, 468 (1990) (employee will not "be employed by" any competi-
tor); Paramount Termite Control Co., Inc. v. Rector, 238 Va. 171, 172, 380 S.E.2d 922, 924
(1989) (employee "will not engage.., in the carrying on or conducting the business of'
former employer); Roanoke Eng'g Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 547, 551, 290 S.E.2d
882, 883 (1982) (employee will not "directly or indirectly.., be employed by" any compet-
ing business); Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 579, 95 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1956) (employee will
not "enter into the insurance business ... or associate himself or herself with any" insur-
ance agency)).
128. Id. at 494-95, 561 S.E.2d at 695.
129:. 239 Va. 369, 389 S.E.2d 467 (1990).
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the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant on the basis that it
precluded a former employee from any type of employment with a
competitor. 13' The court explained that in that case, the covenant
was reasonable because another provision in the agreement spe-
cifically permitted the employee to work in the employer's indus-
try in a non-competing role.131 The court concluded that Blue
Ridge provided no support for the employer's position, because
the restrictive covenant in Stinnett did not include a similar pro-
vision. 132
The court rejected the employer's assertion that prior holdings
required the conclusion that as a matter of law the language at
issue is reasonable and not overbroad. 3 3 Because the employer
had not offered any other argument or evidence of any legitimate
business interest served by prohibiting the employee from being
employed in any capacity by a competing company, the court held
that the employer did not carry its burden of showing that the re-
strictive covenant at issue is reasonable and affirmed the trial
court. 
134
This decision illustrates the care that must be exercised in
drafting non-compete agreements. While a company surely would
never intend to prohibit a departing executive from working as a
janitor at a competing business, and while the reality of such a
scenario stretches the imagination, the naked possibility of such a
change in position can render a non-compete unenforceable
should it restrict such a job change.
Perhaps the most controversial decision of the past year in this
area of the law was issued not by the Supreme Court of Virginia,
but by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia in Mona Electric Group, Inc. v. Truland Service Corp.135
In that case, the employer attempted to enforce a non-solicitation
covenant against a former employee.'36 The court began its analy-
sis by addressing whether there was sufficient consideration to
support the existence of a binding contract between the two par-
ties.137
130. Stinnett, 263 Va. at 495, 561 S.E.2d at 695.
131. Blue Ridge, 239 Va. at 370-71, 389 S.E.2d at 468.
132. Stinnett, 263 Va. at 495, 561 S.E.2d at 696.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 496, 561 S.E.2d at 696.
135. 193 F. Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Va. 2002).
136. Id. at 875.
137. Id.
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The employer argued that its continued employment of the de-
fendant constituted adequate consideration for a restrictive cove-
nant. 138 The court concluded that there was a split in the author-
ity on this issue, noting that the majority of reported decisions
appear to follow the employer's rationale,139 while other courts
have "ruled that continued employment, by itself, does not create
implied consideration." 4 °
The court stated that "[nieither the Fourth Circuit nor the Su-
preme Court of Virginia has addressed this issue," and turned to
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for guidance."' The
Virginia court noted that the West Virginia court, in ruling upon
a contract governed by Virginia law, had opined that
"Virginia's highest court would probably follow the holding in Kistler
that when the relationship of employer and employee is established
without a restrictive covenant not to compete, any agreement there-
after not to compete, must be in the nature of a new contract based
upon new consideration."
142
The district court then likewise concluded that the Supreme
Court of Virginia would find that the mere continuation of em-
ployment does not furnish consideration for a non-competition
agreement under the facts of this case and ruled that the agree-
ment was void for want of consideration. 143 The court found it sig-
nificant that the employer did not advise the former employee
that failure to sign the agreement would result in termination or
in any other employment action. 4
138. Id. at 875-76.
139. Id. at 876 (citing Daughtry v. Capital Gas Co., Inc., 285 Ala. 89, 229 So. 2d 480
(1969); Roessler v. Burwell, 119 Conn. 289, 176 A. 126 (1934); Tasty Box Lunch Co. v.
Kennedy, 121 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Cir. App. 1960); Thomas v. Coastal Indust. Servs., Inc.,
214 Ga. 832, 108 S.E.2d 328 (1959); Maynard v. Kohls, 203 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa 1972); Frier-
son v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co., 247 Miss. 157, 154 So. 2d 151 (1963); Sarco Co. v. Gulli-
ver, 3 N.J. Misc. 641, 649, 129 A. 399 (N.J. Ch. 1925), affd, 99 N.J. Eq. 432 (1926); Bet-
tinger v. North Fort Worth Ice Co., 278 S.W. 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925)).
140. Id. (citing Forrest Paschal Machinery Co. v. Milholen, 27 N.C. App. 678, 220
S.E.2d 190 (1975); Morgan Lumber Sales Co. v. Toth, 41 Ohio Misc. 17, 321 N.E.2d 907
(1974); Kistler v. O'Brien, 464 Pa. 475, 347 A.2d 311 (1975); Maintenance Specialties, Inc.
v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 314 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1974); Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 338
S.C. 271, 525 S.E.2d 898 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999), affd, 345 S.C. 378, 548 S.E.2d 207 (S.C.
2001)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 876 (quoting PEMCO Corp. v. Rose, 163 W. Va. 420, 427, 257 S.E.2d 885,
889 (1979)).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Despite ruling that the agreement was void, the court con-
cluded there was no evidence that the former employee violated
the agreement by "soliciting" the employer's customers.145 The
court cited the absence of any evidence that the former employee
had initiated calls to customers during his subsequent employ-
ment.'46 Instead, the court concluded that
[the former employee] responded to customer calls to [the new em-
ployer] for bids.
[The employee's] acts of responding to customers who solicited him
for bids clearly do not violate the Agreement. [The employee] did not
sign an agreement that prohibited him from competing with [his
former employer], he signed an agreement that precisely prohibited
his "solicitation" of Plaintiffs customers. Plaintiff asserts that the
Agreement prevents [the employee] from submitting estimates to
customers who call him to request bids. This would turn the non-
solicitation agreement into a non-competition agreement, and under
the unambiguous terms of the Agreement, only solicitation of [the
former employers] customer's [sic] is prohibited.
Thus, the court observed that even if it were to find the agree-
ment valid, there was no evidence that the former employee vio-
lated the terms of the agreement. 14 Accordingly, the court en-
tered summary judgment for the former employee.4
IV. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND NEGLIGENT HIRING AND
RETENTION
A. Respondeat Superior
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior-literally, "let the
master answer"-an employer is liable for the tortious acts of its
employee if the employee was performing his employer's business
and acting within the scope of his employment when the tortious
acts were committed. 5 ° The test for employer liability is not
whether the tortious act itself is a transaction within the ordinary
145. Id.
146. Id. at 877.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Kensington Assocs. v. West, 234 Va. 430, 432, 362 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1987); see
also Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. Enger, 257 Va. 513, 515 S.E.2d 111 (1999).
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course of the employer's business, but whether the service in
which the tortious act was accomplished was within the ordinary
course of such business.15'
In Cooper v. Hansbury,52 a woman pursued a claim of sexual
assault against defendant laboratory under the theory of respon-
deat superior where the laboratory's technician allegedly sexually
assaulted her during the course of performing a blood test.153 The
defendant demurred, contending that the alleged conduct, if it oc-
curred at all, was outside the scope of the technician's employ-
ment. 154 The circuit court overruled the demurrer, explaining:
Plaintiff alleges that after defendant Hansbury administered a blood
test, an activity within the ordinary course of his employment, he
sexually assaulted her. Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment contains an
allegation of an injury caused by the willful and wrongful act of an
employee committed in the course of the employer-employee rela-
tionship and within the scope of his employment. It alleges that
Hansbury was Collection Specialists' employee, that he assaulted
Cooper at his regular place of employment, and that he did so while
he was performing the business of his employer for which plaintiff
was the employer's customer. A review of the facts, and reasonable
inferences therefrom, alleged in plaintiffs Motion for Judgment
compels this [clourt to conclude that plaintiff has pleaded sufficient
facts which, if proven, would create a jury issue whether Hansbury
was acting within the scope of his employment.
1 55
Thus, employers are now feeling the force of the Supreme
Court of Virginia's recent decisions in Gina Chin & Assoc., Inc. v.
First Union Bank5 ' and Majorana v. Crown Central Petroleum
Corp., 157 which render it virtually impossible for employers to
prevail prior to trial on a "scope of duty" defense.5 s
151. Giant of Maryland, Inc., 257 Va. at 516-17, 515 S.E.2d at 112-13.
152. 55 Va. Cir. 322 (Cir. Ct. 2001) (Arlington County).
153. Id. at 323.
154. See id. at 322-23.
155. Id. at 323 (citations omitted).
156. 260 Va. 533, 544, 537 S.E.2d 573, 579 (2000).
157. 260 Va. 521, 539 S.E.2d 426 (2000).
- 158., See Winn, Labor and Employment, supra note 64, at 731-34 (discussing the Chin
and Majorana decisions and their likely impact).
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B. Negligence in Hiring and Retention
Outgrowths of the doctrine of respondeat superior, claims of
negligence in employment continue to become more commonplace
and have been pursued hotly in Virginia's courts in recent years.
These claims differ from claims of respondent superior because
"negligent hiring [and retention are] ... doctrine[s] of primary li-
ability; the employer is principally liable for negligently placing
an unfit person in an employment situation involving an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to others."'59
Negligent hiring has been recognized for some time in Vir-
ginia.16 A plaintiff must demonstrate to the court
that an employee had a propensity for the conduct that ultimately
resulted in the injury to others and knowledge of the propensity was
reasonably discoverable; the employer failed to inquire; and, had the
employer inquired, it would not have placed the employee in the po-
sition that it did .... [U]nlike the knowledge element for negligent
supervision or retention, the knowledge must occur prior to the hir-
ing or placement.
16 1
By comparison, negligent supervision claims allege that the
employer negligently monitored the offender's activities. '62 The
Supreme Court of Virginia has declined to recognize the tort of
negligent supervision and does not impose a duty of reasonable
care upon an employer in the supervision of its employees.163
Negligent retention is distinct from a negligent hiring or negli-
gent supervision claim in that, in the negligent retention context,
159. J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 236 Va. 206, 211, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394
(1988) (quoting Note, Minnesota Developments-Employer Liability for the Criminal Acts
of Employers Under Negligent Hiring Theory: Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 68 MINN. L.
REV. 1303, 1306-07 (1984)).
160. See, e.g., Southeastern Apartments Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 257 Va. 256, 513
S.E.2d 395 (1999); Courtney v. Ross Stores, Inc., 45 Va. Cir. 429 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Fairfax
County) (noting that the tort of negligent hiring has a long history in the Commonwealth
dating back at least to 1903).
161. Ross Stores, 45 Va. Cir. at 430 (citing Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 78-81 112 S.E.
628, 631-32 (1922)); see also Berry v. Scott & Stringfellow, 45 Va. Cir. 240 (Cir. Ct. 1998)
(Norfolk City).
162. See Paul Fletcher, Negligent Retention: Your Success May Depend on Whether You
Sue in State or Federal Court, VA. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 29, 1997, at B1.
163. See, e.g., C&P Telephone v. Dowdy, 235 Va. 55, 61, 365 S.E.2d 751, 754 (1988); see
also Ross Stores, 45 Va. Cir. at 432 ("In Virginia, there is no duty of reasonable care im-
posed upon an employer in the supervision of its employees under these circumstances and
we will not create one here.").
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the employee argues that the employer knew of the offender's
prior bad acts but kept the offender in his position anyway, thus
unreasonably exposing others to harm.'64 In opining on the tort of
negligent retention, the courts have noted that, for liability to be
imposed, the employer must "negligently retain or fail to fire or
remove an employee after learning of the employee's incompe-
tence, negligence, or unfitness for a position."'65
While the lower courts continue to address negligent hiring and
retention claims, over the past year the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia analyzed these torts in only one case, Interim Personnel of
Central Virginia, Inc. v. Messer.'66 In Messer, the court addressed
appeals arising from a single action which alleged negligent hir-
ing, where the dispositive question was whether the trial court
erred in ruling that foreseeability was a jury issue.'67 In Messer,
the plaintiff was injured when the vehicle she was operating was
struck from the rear by the defendant, Ricky Edward East
("East"), who was intoxicated and negligently operating a pickup
truck that he had stolen from one of the defendants, the Univer-
sity of Virginia Alumni Association ("the Association"). 68
At the time of the accident, East was employed by one of the
defendants, Interim Personnel of Central Virginia, Inc. ("In-
terim"), a temporary employment service, and assigned to work
for the Association.'69 East's job required that he maintain "a
valid Virginia driver's license," which at no time relevant did he
actually have. 7 ° East had been convicted of driving under the in-
fluence of intoxicants on two prior occasions and eventually was
declared a habitual offender by the Department of Motor Vehicles
164. See Fletcher, supra note 162, at B1. Prior to the Supreme Court of Virginia's deci-
sion in Southeastern Apartments Management, Inc. v. Jackman, 257 Va. 256, 513 S.E.2d
395 (1999), courts in Virginia were split on the issue of the viability of the tort of negligent
retention. See, e.g., Tremel v. Reid, 45 Va. Cir. 364, 383 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Albemarle
County).
165. Ross Stores, 45 Va. Cir. at 431; see also Berry, 45 Va. Cir. at 247.
166. 263 Va. 435, 559 S.E.2d 704 (2002); see also Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va.
230, 564 S.E.2d 127 (2002) (holding that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the
,city could not be held liable under negligent retention theory for alleged rapes by an officer
during an ongoing investigation of the alleged victim's complaint concerning her son).
.167. Messer, 263 Va. at 437, 559 S.E.2d 705.
,.168. Id. at 438, 559 S.E.2d at 705.
169. Id. at 438, 559 S.E.2d at 706.
170. Id.
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("DMV").171 East misrepresented that he possessed a valid "Class
A" driver's license on his employment application. 172 Prior to his
employment, Interim administered "a series of basic skill tests"
and his references were checked prior to his assignment to vari-
ous employers.
173
Subsequently, East left the employment of Interim. 74 He later
returned to work for the agency, at which time he completed an-
other application form that sought current information.1 75 Again,
he misrepresented the status of his driver's license and failed to
disclose his criminal background.'76 Interim did not conduct a
criminal background check; nor did it request proof of a valid
driver's license or check East's DMV record. 17 Prior to the as-
signment that led to the accident for which the plaintiff brought
suit, the Association, which had retained East's services through
Interim, did not ask East to produce a driver's license or even ask
if he had one. 7 ' Instead, the company relied on the temporary
service to verify he was a licensed driver.'79
After two weeks on the job, East procured a key to the truck he
routinely operated, stole the truck, "traveled to Richmond, and
returned to his Charlottesville home on Friday, when he began
drinking beer [around eight quarts] and riding around in the
truck.... [He] eventually drove the truck into the rear of a
stopped vehicle that struck the rear of the plaintiffs stopped ve-
hicle."'80
The court began its analysis of the negligent hiring claim by
repeating the standard it established in Southeast Apartments
Management v. Jackman:
[T]he cause of action for negligent hiring "is based on the principle
that one who conducts an activity through employees is subject to li-
ability for harm resulting from the employer's conduct if the em-
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 438-39, 559 S.E.2d at 706.
174. Id. at 439, 559 S.E.2d at 706.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 440, 559 S.E.2d at 707.
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ployer is negligent in the hiring of an improper person in work in-
volving an unreasonable risk of harm to others."
Liability for negligent hiring is based upon an employer's failure to
exercise reasonable care in placing an individual with known pro-
pensities, or propensities that should have been discovered by rea-
sonable investigation, in an employment position in which, due to
the circumstances of the employment, it should have been foresee-
able that the hired individual posed a threat of injury to others.
1 8 1
The court cautioned, however, that "[m] ere proof of the failure to
investigate a potential employee's background is not sufficient to
establish an employer's liability for negligent hiring."
1 82
For the purpose of discussion, the court assumed, but did not
decide, that the corporate defendants "in the exercise of reason-
able care" should have discovered "East's propensities for operat-
ing a motor vehicle without a valid operator's license, for failing
to obey court orders to pay fines and to attend counseling, and for
driving while intoxicated.""3 Nonetheless, the court held
that the plaintiff failed, as a matter of law, to establish that, because
of the circumstances of the employment, it should have been foresee-
able that East posed a threat of injury to others.
[T]he mere fact that East had been convicted twice of DUI, had failed
to pay fines or attend counseling, and had been declared an habitual
offender, would not place a reasonable employer on notice or make it
foreseeable that East would steal a truck, operate the stolen vehicle
during non-business hours for his own frolic, and cause an accident
on the open highway distant from the environs of his job. According
to the uncontradicted evidence, East's employment history showed
he had been a model employee, never had consumed alcohol at work
or reported for work intoxicated, never had been in any motor vehicle
accidents, never had taken any item from any employer without
permission, and had no record of theft. In sum, it was not Interim's
placement of East, or his subsequent acceptance for work at the As-
sociation, which was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.
18 4
181. Id. (quoting Southeastern Apartments Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 257 Va. 256, 260,
513 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1999) (citations omitted)).
182. Id. (citing Majorana v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, 260 Va. 521, 531, 539 S.E.2d 426,
431 (2000)).
183. Id. at 442, 559 S.E.2d at 708.
184. Id. at 442-43, 559 S.E.2d at 708.
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Consequently, the court held that the "trial court erred in rul-
ing that foreseeability was a jury issue."'' 5
V. 2002 LEGISLATION
Following is a summary of legislation impacting workplace law
from the 2002 General Assembly Session." 6
A. Pay Schedule
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 40.1-29
to provide that employers can pay employees once a month as
long as the employees' "weekly wages total more than 150 percent
of the average weekly wage of the Commonwealth as defined in §
65.2-500(B)."" 7 The employer can implement this pay schedule as
long as the employee agrees to be paid once a month.'
B. Employee Protection
1. Protection for Reporting Threatening Conduct
The General Assembly created new legislation, Virginia Code
section 40.1-51.4:5, which provides immunity to employees who
report threatening workplace conduct."8 9
2. Prohibition on Penalizing Employees for Absence Due to Court
Appearance or Jury Duty
The General Assembly expanded the statutory protections
available to employees who are summoned or subpoenaed to court
to include persons "who, having appeared, [are] required in writ-
185. Id. at 443, 559 S.E.2d at 708.
186. For a comprehensive review of the General Assembly's past term, see
http://legis.state.va.us.
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-29 (Repl. Vol. 2002); see also id. § 65.2-500(B) (Repl. Vol.
1995).
188. Id. § 40.1-29.
189. Id. § 40.1-51.4:5 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
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ing by the court to appear at any future hearing."19 ° Employees
who have given the employer notice of the court appearance are
now protected from discharge, adverse personnel action, or being
forced to use sick leave or vacation time for such an absence. 191
An employer who fails to comply with this statute is guilty of a
Class 3 misdemeanor.
92
3. Prohibition on "Genetic Testing or Genetic Characteristics as a
Condition of Employment"
93
Employers may no longer (i) "require... a genetic test ... as a
condition of employment" or (ii) "refuse to hire, fail to promote,
discharge, or otherwise adversely affect any terms or condition of
employment" based on such characteristics or tests.194 An em-
ployer or prospective employer may, however, use such informa-
tion for decisions about "long-term care, life or disability insur-
ance policy."' 95 Violators are subject to actual or punitive
damages, including back pay with interest, or injunctive relief.96
4. Protections for Members of the Military Reserves
The General Assembly added new sections to the Virginia Code
which provide for increased job security for members of the mili-
tary reserves.'97 The new legislation guarantees members of the
Virginia National Guard, Virginia State Defense Force, or naval
militia called to active state duty by the Governor the right to
take leave without pay from civilian employment. 9 ' The bill also
guarantees that if the employee is still qualified for his previous
employment after the service, he or she must immediately be re-
stored to the previous position or to a "position of like seniority,
status and pay," unless the employer's circumstances make the
190. Id. § 18.2-465.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. § 40.1-28.7:1 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
194. Id. § 40.1-28.7:1(A)(1)-(2).
195. Id. § 40.1-28.7:1(D).
196. Id. § 40.1-28.7:1(B).
197. Id. §§ 44-93 to -93.5 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
198. Id. § 44.93-2 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
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restoration unreasonable.199 If the employee is no longer qualified
for the previous position, he or she must be placed in another po-
sition, for which the employee is qualified, and that will give the
employee appropriate seniority, status, and salary, unless the
employer's circumstances now make the placement unreason-
able.2 °°
5. Service as a Union Officer
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 40.1-61
to prohibit employers from requiring a person to abstain or re-
frain from holding office in a labor union or labor organization as
a condition of gaining or continuing employment.2 1
VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly, employment and labor law in Virginia was affected by
several important decisions over the past year. Like the prior
year, this past year lacked the blockbuster decisions involving the
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, but a
steady stream of such claims in the lower courts likely will fuel
further decisions by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Once again,
the evolving case law in the enforcement of non-competitive
agreements underscores the necessity of drafting covenants not to
compete that are not overly broad in geographic scope and/or du-
ration, not unduly burdensome to the employee and their ability
to earn a livelihood, and are rationally related to the employer's
interests. Even in the absence of enforceable covenants not to
compete, employees must walk the fine line between merely pre-
paring to compete with an employer and breaching the fiduciary
duty of loyalty owed to the employer.
In addition, the plaintiffs bar continues to follow a national
trend in pursuing claims against employers under common law
negligence theories. The past year's decisions again afford fuel for
future litigation against employers vicariously through the doc-
trine of respondeat superior and directly through negligent hiring
199. Id.
200. Id. § 44.93-3 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
201. Id. § 40.1-61 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
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and retention claims. These decisions have further fleshed out the
standards for such claims and provide guidance for practitioners
involved in litigation involving these theories.

